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Recent World Bank reports (and the work of Robert
Bates) have placed the blame for Africa's current
economic crisis squarely in the lap of the African
governments. They argue that the inadequate
representation of farmers within the development
coalition has given rise to the bleeding of agriculture to
support industrial development. According to them,
Africa's current economic crisis is due to excessive
levels of state intervention and domestic mis-
management. These views have given rise to
recommendations for 'structural reforms', the gist of
which is that reduced state intervention and freeing up
of markets will promote greater incentives for farmers
and general economic 'efficiency'.
In this paper I intend to explore the general issue of
state and market in agricultural development through
an examination of Kenyan experience, focusing on a
case study of two commodities whose development
has taken different paths in the post-colonial period. I
shall be concerned, first, to investigate the determinants
of specific policy decisions on these two export crops.
It is my contention that policy choice does not merely
reflect considerations of technical or economic
efficiency, but is deeply embedded in the political and
social context. Discussion of policy choices will
therefore be situated in the context of the wide range of
conditions and constraints (national and international;
economic, ecological and political) which have staged
the development of these two commodities.
Historically, this article concentrates on the specific
conjuncture of factors which give rise to a particular
policy outcome, such as the choice of the estate form
of production in the case of pineapples in the 1960s.
Second, particular attention is paid to examining the
nature and type of state intervention over time, the
specific mixture of public and private involvement in
the development of each commodity, in terms of
investment, marketing, scale and form of production
and choice of technique.
The State in Kenya
It is important first to understand the origins and
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character of the Kenyan state which emerged in the
post-colonial period. From the outset of colonial rule
in Kenya, the administration represented both
internal and external class forces, although the
balance between these shifted in each historical
period. In the inter-war years the resident section of
estate capital, the white settlers, were the dominant
political force. A highly interventionist form of state
emerged with organisations such as crop marketing
boards which facilitated the extraction of surplus from
agriculture. African peasants were confined to 'Native
Reserves' and hedged in by restrictions, The settlers
controlled access to lucrative export crops like tea and
coffee and African production was seen as 'comple-
mentary' to the European sector.
The balance of internal and external classes was torn
apart by the rise of African nationalism in the post-
war period. After World War lithe ownership and
control of capital began to undergo a shift in favour of
international capital and settler economic and
political power began to decline. New forms of finance
capital became intimately linked with the inter-
ventionist state in Britain which was strongly
influenced by Fabian socialism [Cowen: 1983]. The
new colonial policy after World War II was fuelled by
the need to raise levels of production and productivity
in the territories. In Kenya the metropolitan state
helped to facilitate the political transition from settler
monopoly power to African majority rule.
Economically, it broke the settler monopoly in
agriculture and began to encourage peasant small-
holder schemes. Both of the case studies here were
designated crops under the Swynnerton Plan of 1954
which sought to develop African smallholder
agriculture [Swainson: 1980, ch 3].
With the advent of independence in 1963 an
embryonic African bourgeoisie took over the formal
reins of power and this group dominated the state
politically. The post-colonial state in Kenya has been
characterised by a dynamic fusion of national and
international tendencies. For instance, there has been
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an extension of indigenous control over both
agricultural production and trade at the same time as
an increase in foreign investment and aid from abroad.
The latter has become partly significant in the
recessionary conditions of the early 1980s. lt is against
this historical and structural backdrop that we should
view specific public policies to stimulate export crop
production. Let us begin with pineapples.
Pineapples
Pineapples had been grown for the local market since
the early colonial period. The development of
pineapples for export was a feature of the post-war
period when the colonial government wanted to
encourage the flow of agricultural produce from
sterling areas in order to ease the dollar deficit. The
growing side of the industry formed part of the
Swynnerton Plan and the colonial administration
provided generous concessions to build up infra-
structure to service a new canning factory in Thika,
about 20 miles north of Nairobi. Kenya Canners was
jointly owned by settler farmers and a British firm,
Pickering and West. This company and a few smaller
ones made up the East African Food Packers
Association. The immediate problem facing the
enterprise was to integrate smallholder inputs with
factory production. The main issue concerning the
industry was to maintain a consistent quality and flow
of fruit into the factory. By 1957, in the face of falling
international prices for canned fruit, the Canning
Crops Board was set up by the colonial government to
regulate the industry: to fix acreages through licensing
and to guarantee the growers minimum prices.
The nature of international competition shaped the
fortunes of this industry in Kenya. International prices
for canned pineapple began to recover after 1960, at a
time when the smallholder fruit was coming on
stream. The factory needed to expand its processing
capacity, but the British firm found that it lacked
capital and expertise to expand operations effectively.
It was in this context that the large American
conglomerate, the California Packing Corporation
(Calpak or Delmonte), was given the managing
agency for the Kenyan enterprise in 1964. In that year
the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya
(DFCK) made the company a loan for expansion
conditional upon a technical link-up with the
International Canning Organisation, dominated by
Calpak [Kaplinsky 1979:826]. The whole expansion
programme of the Kenyan company came to depend
on the technical expertise and international market
linkages that were offered by the large multinational.
A new agreement was signed in 1965 which gave the
company the option to take up a majority
shareholding in the project.
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In terms of organisation of pineapple production it
was assumed that the company would develop its own
estates at the same time as using the pineapples grown
by African smallholders. The government proceeded
to buy up large tracts of land in the Thika district
which had been used for growing sisal and coffee.
These estates were then leased by the company at a
peppercorn rent (since it is not permitted in Kenya for
foreign firms to purchase land directly). Nevertheless,
the company continued to expect the Canning Crops
Board to guarantee a throughput of smallholder
pineapples to the factory until their own estates
reached maturity. Indeed, between 1965 and 1968 the
government encouraged further extensions in small-
holder pineapples.
By 1968, it had become blatantly clear that the
company preferred to phase out the smallholders and
convert their production entirely. Kenya Canners
complained that there was not a sufficient throughput
of smaliholder pineapples and the fruit did not meet
the required standard for processing. Although it was
never made explicit, the government helped the
company to convert its production to the estate form
on very favourable terms. Through their control of
licensing, the Canning Crops Board was able to give
Kenya Canners almost exclusive growing rights for
canning pineapple in Kenya. By the late 1960s,
therefore, many small farmers in the Thika district
found they had no market for their produce since the
company was rejecting their pineapples. Most of the
African farmers were able to switch to other crops,
although many were saddled with loans and the
government was required to write off most of these
debts [for further details see Swainson 1980: 156-67].
Thus in a period of four to five years this large
corporation had managed to gain control over the
production and marketing of pineapples for export,
and effectively strangle a smallholder growing scheme.
The company has established itself in Kenya in order
to diversify from its traditional growing areas in the
Philippines and Hawaii where labour unions had
become demanding. Production costs in Kenya were
lower and labour more subdued. Through a network
of high level political alliances, the firm was able to
enlist government assistance for its moves. Several
government ministers were given shares and put on the
board of directors. Using techniques appropriate to
large-scale scientific production (such as mulching
and use of fertiliser) and mechanisation, the firm was
able to raise productivity and standards of the fruit.
Naturally enough the labour force expanded rapidly,
from 400 workers in 1961 (factory only) to over 10,000
by 1976 (factories and combined estate). The firm
invested heavily in new equipment and machinery for
both factory and estate operations and declared
operating losses between 1965 and 1974. Admittedly
the firm was ploughing back surplus from its
operations into this massive expansion programme.
However, Kaplinsky [1979] has calculated that the
company managed to maximise its profit repatriation
by under-invoicing exports and over-valuing intra-
firm imports.
What were the factors behind the decline of the
smaliholder pineapple scheme and why did the
industry in Kenya succumb to the 'logic' of large-scale
production? First of all, the international market for
canned pineapple (and fruit generally) is highly
competitive and dominated by several large trans-
nationals, including Calpak. With a highly competitive
market the transnational firms in the fruit industry are
faced with a constant struggle to improve productivity
and maintain their edge. The central requirements of
successful export production are to ensure homogeneity
and quality. Mechanisation is a process suited to a
product that requires a high level of homogeneity.
Secondly, pineapples suitable for canning require very
specific production conditions: they can only be
grown at a particular altitude as the acidity level and
size of fruit must be exactly right. The Thika district in
Kenya is one of the few which fulfils all these
ecological requirements. Third, the Canning Crops
Board did not deliver in quality control and technical
inputs effectively to African peasants in the l950s. It
may have been that there was not sufficient technical
expertise channelled into the growing scheme at the
crucial time, as was the case with tea. At a purely
economic level pineapples for canning are grown most
efficiently on large-scale estates, which is why this
form is predominant in the global industry. Fourth,
the political costs of this shift were kept within
bounds. The destruction of a smaliholder growing
scheme in any other area of Kenya might have caused
severe political problems. Although a number of
Africans living on the edge of the estate 'zone' in Thika
were inconvenienced by the loss of their market, they
responded by switching to other crops. Despite the
fact that there was considerable political opposition to
this turn of events, there was no major threat of social
unrest [Swainson 1980:163]. Many people in the area
were subsequently drawn into wage labour on the
estates or in the factory.
The colonial state played a major role in developing
the pineapple industry in the 1950s in Kenya by
providing organisation for the growers and subsidised
infrastructure for the factory. The post-colonial state
in the l960s assumed responsibility for the smallholder
growing scheme. The form of production required by
the international market and lack of existing
organisational networks compelled the government to
restructure the industry by collaborating with a major
transnational firm. By means of high level political
alliances the firm was able to extract extensive
concessions from the government which enabled it to
establish a monopoly position in the production of
pineapples for export.
The Case of Tea
Tea was first planted in Kenya in the early l920s and it
has played a central role as an export earner from the
1930s to the present. Before World War II, tea along
with coffee was grown exclusively on settler or foreign
owned estates. There has been a rapid expansion in tea
production in post-colonial Kenya, with production
rising from 138,000 metric tons in 1960 to 966,000
metric tons in 1980 (KTDA Annual Reports). Most of
this increase can be explained by. raised productivity
on the estates and the expansion of the smaliholder tea
area. Tea grown by African peasants has accounted
for roughly one third of total annual marketed tea
output by volume and more than one third by value
since the mid l970s. In the year 1980/81, 85 per cent of
smallholder tea was exported [Lamb and Muller
1982:1].
Since the 1920s tea in Kenya has been dominated by
several large corporations, notably Brooke Bond (now
Brooke Bond Leibig) which had extensive interests in
India and Sri Lanka. Tea was established as a
plantation crop for export much earlier than
pineapple. The two major firms, Brooke Bond and
James Finlay, were able to purchase large areas of
land from settlers in the west of Kenya. This area
around Kericho was ideal for tea cultivation, being at
the correct altitude with good rainfall and on the edge
of an impoverished reserve area (Nyanza) which
supplied cheap labour for the estates. After World
War II, in the face of intensified world market
competition, it was necessary for the large firms to
raise productivity. The Brooke Bond company
applied scientific methods, and better forms of labour
organisation and unions were recognised on the tea
estates.
(i) The smallholder tea scheme
Tea along with pineapples was promoted as a
'designated crop' to be grown by African farmers
under the Swynnerton Plan. This scheme gave
individual land tenure to Africans in certain areas of
the country and broke the racial barrier surrounding
major export crops such as tea. The board responsible
for coordinating the smaliholder tea scheme in Kenya
was the Special Crops Development Authority
(SCDA) which became the Kenya Tea Development
Authority (KTDA) after independence in 1963. The
KTDA has in the contemporary period been hailed as
one of the most successful examples of institutional
development in contemporary Africa. The scheme is
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considered a model of smaliholder rural development
and the KTDA an efficient' public sector enterprise.
The SCDA in the 1950s was composed of government
staff and experts from the commercial tea companies,
Brooke Bond, James Finlay and Eastern Produce. The
success of the tea scheme lay in the sequenced control
of strategic aspects of the tea cycle and control of the
quality of both production stock (i.e. tea plants) and
the growers. The cultivation of tea was controlled
through a tight system of licensing. In the 1950s sun-
dried tea (locally grown by Africans and sold in
informal markets) was declared illegal in order to
develop and maintain high standards of cultivation on
peasant plots. Government nurseries supplied the
African farmers with tea plants, and by the 1970s they
were able to use vegetative propagation methods on
their own plots to obtain new plants.
The foreign companies were initially hostile to the
smallholder tea scheme as they feared falling prices
and loss of market control. Nevertheless, they soon
realised that this scheme could be used to their own
advantage so long as standards were enforced and the
product could be integrated into their global system.
The firms in the 1950s provided their expertise to the
Department of Agriculture on both the growing and
manufacturing side of tea production. They assisted in
the construction of KTDA factories during the 1960s
and 1970s and provided management for the authority
until local managers could be trained. The latter
objective was achieved by the late 1960s. By 1981, out
of the 27 KTDA factories, only eight were managed
under contract by three foreign firms.
The authority has tried to restrict the average size of
holding to one hectare in order to ensure quality, and
strict plucking standards (two leaves and a bud) have
been adhered to in most areas. Plucking standards are
more difficult to supervise on estates. Appendix 1
shows that the rate of increase in yields per hectare for
estates was much higher than for smallholder tea
between 1971 and 1982. However, it must be borne in
mind that the level of inputs into estate production is
much higher than that for smallholders. Smallholder
tea in Kenya is of a consistently higher quality than
that grown on estates. The advantage to the Brooke
Bond Corporation is that they can buy the higher
quality teas from the KTDA and blend these with
lower quality tea that was cheaper to produce.
(ii) Finance for the smallholder scheme
During the colonial period, the tea scheme represented
a project of international capital, while in the post-
colonial era it came increasingly under local control
[Cowen 1983]. After independence the KTDA became
more autonomous, and independent from commercial
42
companies such as Brooke Bond. The tea scheme was
initially a project of the Colonial Development
Corporation (CDC), an organisation of finance
capital set up after World War lito promote industrial
and agricultural projects in the colonial territories [for
further details on the history of the CDC, see Rendell
1976]. The CDC has continued to play a central role in
financing the scheme, although the World Bank
financed much of the factory construction and
infrastructural development in the l970s and l980s.
The CDC had lent approximately £16 mn st. to the
KTDA by 1981, and it continued to be involved in the
factory construction programme.
Other external funding has been provided by the West
German government, the European Investment Bank
and OPEC. The Kenya government and parastatal
financial corporations have also provided substantial
loan capital to the KTDA Lamb 1982:15]. In 1973
there were 17 factories, but by 1984 the number had
grown to 33. The cost of servicing loans (75 per cent of
which are designated in foreign currency) became a big
burden on the KTDA in the 198 1/82 recession. The
tea scheme has consistently relied upon international
finance to build up infrastructure and productive
facilities.
(iii) Payment system
Much of the current discussion of the efficacy of
agricultural policy in Africa has centred on payment
and incentives for farmers. The tea growers in Kenya
are remunerated by a complex incentive system which
takes the form of first and second payments. The first
payment is made by weight of green leaf and the
second is made at the end of the year when factory
production figures are clear. Fertilisers and other
inputs are paid for by a deduction from the green leaf
payment at the factory.
Though there is no comprehensive evidence of effects
of tea development on smallholder incomes, estimates
would suggest that most smallholder family units
derive a comfortable income from tea. The
average/annual grower income from tea in 1981 was
K.Sh. 2,673, and for most households tea is not the
only source of income [Lamb 1982:23]. Payments to
growers are affected by the international price of tea
which is reflected in their second payment. The KTDA
have been relatively successful in keeping farmers
consistently in tea, which is important due to the
investment involved and the length of time required
for tea plants to reach maturity. Pricing policy is
crucial, otherwise growers will switch to other more
profitable commodities such as dairy. Many of the
senior managers of the KTDA have private tea
growing interests but this does not seem to have
affected the operational integrity of the authority [for
further analysis see Swainson 1980:262-63].
The KTDA is now concentrating on consolidation
rather than any further expansion of the area under
cultivation. Due to the fact that Kenya produces
relatively high quality teas, it would probably benefit
from an international tea agreement limiting new
planting and production [Schluter 1984:28].
(iv) Reasons for the success of smallholder tea ¡n
Kenya
Although not without its problems, the KTDA's
record has been very good by comparison with other
tea schemes, such as those in Tanzania and South
Asia. Any comparison of smallholder schemes in
particular countries must take into consideration
different historical conditions. Lamb has suggested
that the ins! it utionalfeatures of the KTDA itself have
played an important role in the success of peasant tea.
These institutional factors involve an efficient
management structure which has been largely
localised with a diminished foreign involvement.
Operational and technical autonomy of the KTDA
has been maintained and the authority has a high
degree of centralised control over the conditions of
production and distribution. Favourable incentive
schemes were developed by the authority and payment
to growers was always prompt.
Market conditions have been favourable for tea since
the 1960s. The Corporation sells most of its tea on the
Mombasa or London auctions, although some of the
higher quality teas are sold directly under their factory
label to European countries. The authority controls
the internal distribution of tea, and 10 per cent of each
factory's production (including the estates) is taken as
a 'pool' for the internal market. The KTDA subsidises
the cost of tea to the local consumer. The government
does not levy onerous taxes on tea which would have
reduced the proceeds to the peasant.
Grower participation has been another positive aspect
of the tea scheme in Kenya. The KTDA has since the
1960s encouraged farmers to participate in both policy
making and implementation. The elected divisional
and district tea committees, the provincial tea boards,
and farmer representation on the KTDA board itself
have provided formal channels for advising on the
land allocation process, transmitting KTDA policy
and forwarding grievances.
Originally the KTDA staff dominated at all levels, but
the growers have increasingly taken the initiative and
would appear to make a strong input into policy
[Lamb 1982:19].
Another effective means of ensuring grower partici-
pation has been to encourage them to take shares in
KTDA factories: in 1982 lOper cent of growers held
shares in 16 tea factories. Lamb has stressed that these
shareholders tend to comprise the richer stratum of tea
farmers.
A Comparison of Tea and Pineapple
Clearly tea and pineapple production have taken very
different routes. While tea production has increasingly
shifted from estate to smallholder cultivation,
precisely the opposite occurred in the pineapple
industry where the Calpak conglomerate replaced
smallholder production with large scale 'factory
farming'. How do we account for this?
Part of the explanation lies in the origins of each of the
schemes. The Swynnerton Plan of 1954 had been
conceived and implemented by a metropolitan
government intent upon breaking the dominance of
estate capital (the settlers primarily) over export
commodities. The tea scheme was singled out for
particular nurturing by the CDC - motivated in part
by the large potential for export revenues - and there
was from the outset a massive moral and financial
commitment to its success. No such funds were
available for pineapple growing and that scheme was
seen as being complementary to private capital, which
managed the processing side of the operation.
The combined control over growing and processing in
the case of tea contributed to the foundation of a
well-integrated scheme. Despite nationalist demands
in the mid 1 960s for the pineapple industry to be taken
over by the state, the independent Kenya government
encouraged Calpak to develop estates by the provision
of infrastructure and land. Quality control was
undoubtedly more difficult in the case of pineapples
than in the case of tea, hence the notable lack of
success of the Canning Crops Board in ensuring a
consistent product.
Labour processes tend to be restructured in response
to changing social and political as well as economic
circumstances. For example, in the case of tea despite
the logic of 'economies of scale', both the colonial and
the independent government after 1963 were prepared
to invest heavily in small-scale production. Political
considerations were foremost in the minds of colonial
bureaucrats. More than half of smallholder tea in
Kenya is located in the Central Province, an
overcrowded reserve area which spawned the
nationalist revolt against the British. The development
of successful smallholder agricultural schemes in this
area was seen as a way of developing a compliant and
stable middle peasantry. Peasant production in the
Central Province was also the bedrock of the Kenyatta
regime in the post-colonial era. Nor is the World Bank
blind to this kind of logic in their widespread support
for peasant agricultural schemes. Forms of land-
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holding are regionally specific in Kenya. Large-scale
pineapple cultivation was possible only by developing
areas which had previously been planted with coffee
and sisal. Displacement of peasant produce in this case
did not cause more than a few political ripples.
The World Bank and others have tended to juxtapose
'public' and 'private' development routes as alternative
policy options facing 'rational' planners. The
preceding cases show clearly the way in which, from
the colonial to post-colonial eras, economic develop-
ment has involved the intertwining of public and
private as well as local and foreign. What is clear is
that the very 'success' of either industry in whatever
historical stage was dependent on extensive state
support. International finance, acting through the
state, ensured the excellent infrastructure of the tea
scheme in Kenya. A carefully established organisation
and ready availability of funds ensured the develop-
ment ofa highly effective institutional structure which
has proved to be enduring. No such favourable
conditions existed in the case of pineapples from the
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l950s which might have ensured the more effective
integration of public and private forms of production.
The fact that there was no incorporation of dominant
indigenous farmers into the pineapple smallholder
scheme as there was in tea was another factor
militating against its success. Instead, the post-
colonial government complied with the aims of a
dominant transnational in order to convert the
pineapple growing scheme into large-scale estates.
My previous work on the development of corporate
capitalism in Kenya outlined the central role of the
state in the colonial period in providing the
preconditions necessary for successful capital accumu-
lation in both agriculture and industry. If one bears in
mind the historical background of commodity
production in Africa it is hard to believe that removing
state intervention and encouraging the 'free market'
will solve economic problems in the long term. 'States
and markets' are not mutually exclusive policy options
but part of a wider process of capitalist development,
which is subject to fluctuations and crises.
APPENDIX 1
Tea production, area sown, yields, and smaller payments, 1971-82
Sources: Data provided by the Kenya Tea Board: Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA). Annual Report and Statement of
Accounts, 1980/81 (Nairobi): KTDA, 1981: KTDA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1981/82 (Nairobi: KTDA, 1982):
and Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey: 1979-82 (Nairobi:
Government Printer, 1979-82).
Yields per hectare are estimated by dividing production by the total area sown with tea four years before to allow for time taken
for the tea bush to mature after planting.
2 Average payments to smaliholders are given for fiscal years, so the 1971 figures are for 1971/72 and so forth.
Constant prices are estimated by averaging the upper, middle, and lower income groups under 'Nairobi Annual Retail Price
Increases, 1970-82', in Economic Survey, 1979-82.
Quoted in Lamb and Muller 1982
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Year
Yields of Mature Tea1
Smallholders Estates National First
Average Payment to Smallholders2
Total in
Second Total 1969 Prices3
(kilo grams/hectare) (KSh/kilo gram of green leaf)
1971 874 1,356 1,207 0.88 0.55 1.43 1.32
1972 1,071 1,885 1,588 0.88 0.99 1.87 1.59
1973 1,027 1,900 1,542 0.88 0.33 1.21 0.91
1974 905 1,673 1,328 0.88 0.52 1.40 0.90
1975 873 1,699 1,309 0.88 0.72 1.60 0.90
1976 811 1,741 1,245 0.88 2.54 3.42 1.74
1977 985 2,352 1,575 1.00 1.38 2.38 1.08
1978 1,004 2,433 1,591 1.00 1.33 2.33 0.96
1979 1,011 2,531 1,613 1.00 1.75 2.75 1.02
1980 821 2,278 1,364 1.00 1.50 2.50 0.82
1981 821 2,217 1,327 1.00 1.51 2.51 0.73
1982 851 2,230 1,331 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Year Smal/holders
Production
Estates Total Smal/holders
Area Sown
Estates Total
(million kilograms) (1,000 hectares)
1971 8.1 28.2 36.3 20.5 22.8 43.3
1972 13.1 40.2 53.3 26.5 23.3 49.8
1973 15.1 41.5 56.6 31.2 23.6 54.8
1974 16.2 37.3 53.5 34.6 24.1 58.7
1975 17.9 38.8 56.7 37.2 24.3 61.5
1976 21.5 40.5 62.0 41.4 24.5 65.9
1977 30.7 55.6 86.3 43.6 24.9 68.5
1978 34.8 58.6 93.4 46.9 25.2 72.1
1979 37.6 61.6 99.2 48.9 25.4 74.3
1980 34.0 55.9 89.9 50.7 25.9 76.6
1981 35.8 55.1 90.9 52.7 26.2 78.9
1982 39.9 56.1 96.0 54.7 26.4 81.1
Quantity
Tinned pineapple
Fresh vegetables
Tinned fruit and vegetable juices
Fresh tropical fruit
Dehydrated vegetables
Value
Tinned pineapple
Fresh vegetables
Tinned fruit and vegetable juices
Fresh tropical fruit
Dehydrated vegetables
Total
Source: Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department. Annual Trade Report. 1976-80
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1976-80).
Note: The percentages these crops have in the exports of all horticultural crops are 76.4 for 1976, 76.6 for 1977, 85.6 for 1978, 78.1
for 1979 and 75.2 for 1980.
Quoted in Schluter 1984
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